Fully delegated community child welfare model appears to be more effective than a hybrid state managed service contract model in Florida

Contracting child welfare service delivery to third party service providers is being used increasingly in across Canada.  While third party service providers, often relatively small not-for profit community-based agencies, may, in some instances, be in a better position to build on community resources and tailor programs to the specific needs of children and their families, careful consideration needs to be given to developing contracting mechanisms that allow government administrators to ensure service quality and control costs. In her study of child welfare service reform in Florida, Meeyoung Lamothe examines the challenge of aligning the priorities of government administrators with contract service providers through the lens of Principal (government) Agent (contract agencies) Theory.  Through a series of key informant interviews and analysis of government documents, the author describes Florida’s transition from a service delivery model where the government run child welfare authority administered caseloads but contracted most direct services to hundreds of service providers, to a model where case management responsibilities were transferred to 22 “lead agencies”, who provide some services directly and sub-contract other services.  

State and agency administrators interviewed for the study generally viewed the transition as a success.  The previous contracting process was perceived to be a fragmented compromise between a state run and agency run model, where responsibility for outcomes remained with the state and service contracts were compliance and process driven.  By delegating most of the state’s authority and functions to a small number of not-for profit community agencies, state and agency administrators noted that the reporting relationship was refocused on service outcomes, allowing the lead agencies more flexibility in developing their own program models.  The study revealed some unintended consequences; for example, in addition to delegating more authority to the lead agencies, the reform also stressed increased community involvement, which led to an unexpected shift to “parochial” concerns, hindering statewide policymaking ability.  Interestingly, from a Canadian perspective, the Florida model looks very much like the delegated agency model that has been in place for over a century in several jurisdictions across the country.