Lamothe, M. (2011). Redesigning the Hollow State: A Study of Florida Child Welfare Service Reform through the Lens of Principal-Agent Theory, International Journal of Public Administration, 34, 497–515.
While principal-agency theory has greatly facilitated our understanding of governance and management in the hollow state, close examinations of how system designs affect agency problems has been rare. The purpose of this study is to explicitly investigate the effects of different contract configurations on agent shirking, which is a common problem in third-party service delivery arrangements. Florida's recent statewide privatization and reconfiguration of its child welfare service delivery system are analyzed for this purpose. Data were collected through intensive document reviews and interviews with the public managers and the contract agents who were involved in the reform. Major structural components of the redesigned system (such as overall contract configuration, procurement policies, oversight mechanism, payment methods, and vendor governance structures) are examined and compared with those of the old system.